Wholesale funding, coordination, and credit risk by Zhang, Lei et al.
 http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Zhang, Lei, Zhang , Lin and Zheng, Yong (2013) Wholesale funding, coordination, and 
credit risk. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of 
Warwick. (CAGE Online Working Paper Series). 
Permanent WRAP url: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57954    
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-
profit purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and 
full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original 
metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here is a working paper or pre-print that may be later published 
elsewhere.  If a published version is known of, the above WRAP url will contain details 
on finding it. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: publicatons@warwick.ac.uk  
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy
Department of Economics
February 2013 No.124
Wholesale Funding, Coordination, and Credit Risk
Lei Zhang, Lin Zhang and Yong Zheng
Wholesale Funding, Coordination, and Credit Risk
Lei Zhanga;y, Lin Zhangb and Yong Zhengc
a
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
b
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 610074, P. R. China
c
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, 610074, P. R. China
November 2012
Abstract
We use the global games approach to study key factors aecting the credit risk
associated with roll-over of bank debt. When creditors are heterogenous, these include
the extent of short-term borrowing and capital market liquidity for repo nancing.
Specically, in a model with a large institutional creditor and a continuum of small
creditors independently making their roll-over decisions based on private information,
we nd that increasing the proportion of short-term debt and/or decreasing market
liquidity reduces the willingness of creditors to roll over. This raises credit risk in equi-
librium. The presence of a large creditor does not always reduce credit risk, however,
unless it is better informed.
JEL classication: G01; G14; G20
Keywords: Credit Risk; Coordination; Debt Crisis; Private information; Global games
1 Introduction
Consecutive waves of deregulations and the widespread use of securitized debt instruments
have led many nancial institutions, particularly investment banks, to rely heavily on short-
term borrowing1 to nance their investment in long-term risky assets (Shin 2008). The
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1Gorton & Metrick (2010) suggest the main reason for this reliance is the rapid growth of money under
management by large creditors such as institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds, states and
municipalities, and nonnancial rms. These institutions prefer a demand-deposit-like product.
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nancial crisis of 2007-2008 highlights how heavy reliance on short-term, particularly whole-
sale, debts can expose the nancial system to credit market freeze. Such freeze, precipitated
by collective actions of creditors not rolling over their existing debts, resembles the classic
case of a bank run.
Recently documented evidence has revealed some interesting salient features of the bank-
ing industry leading up to the sub-prime crisis. First is that banks had become increasingly
reliant on short-term instruments to nance their asset holding and these short-term debt
holders were typically heterogenous in their sizes. Second is that banks had increased sig-
nicantly the use of structured nancial products, such as collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs), to attract investors.
Several measures indicates a signicant increase and uctuation in the magnitude of
short-term instruments such as repo, commercial papers and interbank deposits. King (2008)
estimates that the amount of repo was $10 trillion at the end of 2007 roughly doubled since
2000. The size of commercial papers was relatively smaller than repo, but it is as important
as Treasury Bills. The total asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) outstanding in the U.S.
market grew from $650 billion in January 2004 to $1.3 trillion in July 2007. Prior to the
Sub-prime crisis, ABCP was the largest money market instrument in the United States.2
As the wholesale fund markets consist mostly these short-term instruments, their increasing
sizes and uctuations must have played a pivotal role in the sub-prime crisis.
There is also evidence that failures of large nancial institutions may have precipitated
the nancial crisis. Brunnermeier (2010) pointed out that the deterioration in capital market
liquidity coupled with the inability to roll over short-term wholesale debt is one of the direct
causes of the failures of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, and, eventually
led to the collapse of a signicant part of the U.S. nancial system during the 2007-2008
nancial crisis. In the bankruptcy ling of Lehman Brothers, nearly 26 percent of its debt
was held by the 30 largest creditors among more than 100,000 creditors. This illustrates
clearly that creditor composition can have substantial impact on credit markets.
The wide-spread use of structured nancial products created information problem, at
least to creditors of banks. As argued by Haldane (2009), structured nancial products
are complex objects and it is dicult to trace the risks of the structured products to their
underlying assets. There may be added diculty of objectively characterising risks because
of network structure of the banking system: the risks of assets of one bank may be aected by
counterparty risk associated with network structure. This indicates that private information
possessed by the creditors of a bank may be crucial in assessing whether the bank is liquid
or solvent.
This paper studies how these factors, such as features of wholesale funding, creditor
composition and the presence of private information can aect creditor coordination and
thereby inuence credit risk.3 As wholesale nanciers were criticized during the nancial
crisis to rely heavily on information from rating agencies, we are particularly interested
in two questions. The rst is whether a better informed wholesale creditor can decrease
credit risk. The second is whether a larger proportion of wholesale funding in nance banks'
2For comparison, the second largest instrument was Treasury Bills with about $940 billion outstanding.
3To measure the risk in nancial crisis, Gorton and Metrick (2012) constructed a weighted average of
haircut of repo. From September 2007, haircut index kept rising from 5 percent and reached 45 percent at
the end of 2008.
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borrowing can lower credit risk.
Theoretical studies relevant to ours include those focusing on short-term debt nancing
(Morris & Shin 2004), wholesale funding (Calomiris 1999, Huang & Ratnovski 2011), market
liquidity (Diamond & Rajan 2005, Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009), and market freezes
resulting from short-term debt rollover (Plantin 2009, Acharya, Gale & Yorulmazer 2011).
However, to our knowledge, no study exists that addresses how these factors are combined
to aect credit risk.
This paper provides a model to ll in this gap. The key insight that we suggest is that
wholesale funding is a double-edged sword. Unlike Calomiris (1999) focusing on the \bright
side" and Huang and Ratnovski (2011) stressing the \dark side" of wholesale funding, our
model provides general results on the role of wholesale funding when there are interactions
between private information and creditor composition.
Theoretical studies relevant to ours include those focusing on short-term debt nancing
(Morris & Shin 2004), wholesale funding (Calomiris 1999, Huang & Ratnovski 2011), market
liquidity (Diamond & Rajan 2005, Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009), and market freezes
resulting from short-term debt rollover (Plantin 2009, Acharya et al. 2011). However, to our
knowledge, no study exists that addresses how these factors are combined to aect credit
risk.
This paper provides a model to ll in this gap. The key insight that we suggest is that
wholesale funding is a double-edged sword. Unlike Calomiris (1999) focusing on the \bright
side" and Huang and Ratnovski (2011) stressing the \dark side" of wholesale funding, our
model provides general results on the role of wholesale funding depending on interactions
between private information and creditor composition.
Formally, we consider a bank that relies on rolling over short-term debt to nance its
investment in long-term risky assets. Its short-term debt is held by a large creditor (a
wholesale nancier) and a continuum of small creditors. When short-term debt matures,
holders have to decide independently whether to roll over their loans or not. If a creditor
believes that, on average, the other creditors are likely to foreclose on their loans, he/she
will foreclose. As a result, creditors cannot coordinate perfectly when making their rollover
decisions.
To model the role of private information, we follow the global games approach pioneered
by Calsson and van Damme (1993a, 1993b), and popularised by Morris and Shin (2004). In
focusing on the role of large creditor, our work is related to Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris &
Shin (2004) and Liu and Mello (2011). Corsetti et al. (2004) show that the presence of large
traders makes small traders more aggressive in currency attacks. Likewise, in our model,
the presence of less informed large creditors reduces the willingness of small creditors to
roll over. Liu and Mello (2011) show that institutional creditors foreclose if their nancial
positions deteriorate through the lending channel. By focusing on the borrower's balance
sheet instead, we nd that the large creditor will foreclose if the bank is highly leveraged
and the capital market liquidity is low.
In our model, a bank can fail because of coordination failure among creditors. This
is similar in spirit to bank runs studied by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). There, perfect
information produces more than one Nash equilibrium. Rochet and Vives (2004), Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005), and He and Xiong (2011) use global games to obtain unique equilibrium
in bank runs. The main dierence between our model and theirs is that we study bank runs
3
with heterogeneous players.
Studies on credit risk can be traced back to Merton (1974) who employed real-option
method to investigate how default risk is associated with the debtor's asset quality. However,
Merton (1974) considers only a single creditor's decision problem and overlook the credit
risk resulting from coordination failure between the creditors and thereby underestimate the
credit risk. Morris and Shin (2004; 2010) adopt a global-games framework to study how
coordination failure between small creditors can increase credit risk. In our model, we study
credit risk with both large and small creditors.
The main mechanism of the model is as follows. At the renancing stage, the bank's
liquidity depends on how much cash it can raise from the capital markets by pledging its
assets as collateral, which, in turn, depends jointly on its asset quality and market liquidity.
The bank's risky asset return is not perfectly observable. The inability to observe the risky
asset return leads to imperfect coordination between short-term creditors when deciding to
rollover or not their loans. The role of wholesale funding is demonstrated in the case when
additional foreclosure from the wholesale nancier is needed to make the bank fail. In this
case, if the wholesale nancier believes that the bank's nancial position is not sustainable
whether because there is a deterioration in capital market liquidity or because the asset
quality is not good enough, he decides to foreclose. The wholesale nancier's foreclosure
will make the bank fail. Thus, even abstracting from modeling his nancial constraint, the
wholesale nancier may withdraw upon a hint of negative news4.
In general, some of the results obtained from our model are in line with existing literature.
For example, we nd that heavy reliance on short-term debt nancing makes the bank more
vulnerable to creditor runs, and thereby increases credit risk. A decrease in market liquidity
raises credit risk. Other results, particularly related to the interaction between creditor
composition and private information, are quite intriguing.
Given it is likely that information precision and the size could be positively correlated, our
results show that a higher precision in the wholesale nancier's information on the nancial
capacity of the bank increases the willingness of the small creditors to roll over their loans
and thereby reduces credit risk. Intuitively, if the wholesale nancier arbitrarily has more
precise information on the fundamentals of the debtor, his own switching point is lowered.
Because the switching point of the small creditors is positively related to that of the wholesale
nancier, it is reduced as well.
We explicitly model credit risk, which is decomposed, as in Morris and Shin (2010), into
insolvency risk and illiquidity risk. In this respect, the most interesting result from this paper
is that analytically the size eect of the wholesale nancier is ambiguous. This result suggests
that short-term wholesale funding is a double-edged sword such that only under certain
conditions, an increase in the wholesale funding reduces credit risk. Comparing with the case
without wholesale funding, the presence of the wholesale nancier reduces the incidence of
imperfect coordination among small creditors but add new imperfect coordination between
4As documented by Gorton and Metrick (2012), on August 9, 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas stopped
withdrawals from three funds invested in mortgage-backed securities and suspended calculation of net asset
values. The interest rate spread of overnight short-term asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) over the
Federal Funds rate increased from 10 basis points to 150 basis points within one day of the BNP Paribas
announcement. Subsequently, the market experienced a `bank run' that originated in shadow banking, and
ABCP outstanding dropped from $1.3 trillion in July 2007 to $833 billion in December 2007.
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the small creditors and the wholesale nancier. Thus, the overall eect depends on the
relative strength of these two factors. Using dierent combinations of parameter values, our
numerical solutions reveal two conditions under which the overall size eect on credit risk
can be determined. First, an increase in the size of the wholesale nancier reduces credit
risk provided that private information is more precise than public information. Otherwise,
an increase in the size of the wholesale nancier raises credit risk. This result explains why
when wholesale nanciers tend to rely on public but low quality information from rating
agencies, wholesale funding increases credit risk. Second, an increase in the size of wholesale
funding reduces credit risk if and the premium of rolling over is suciently high.
This paper is organized as follows. We present the model in Section 1 and solve the
equilibrium in Section 2. Then, we present the equilibrium properties in Section 3, and
analyze credit risk in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 The model
To study how creditor composition can aect default risks, we focus our attention on the
roll-over of short-term debts. In what follows, we rst set up a roll-over game under perfect
information. This is then extended to incorporate information imperfection. Finally, to set
a benchmark, we outline results in a special case where all short-term creditors are small.
2.1 Timing, players, payos, and perfect information
There are three event dates, ex ante (date 0), interim (date 1), and ex post (date 2), and no
discounting between dates. At date 0, the bank, holding equity of E, issues both long-term
(maturing in two periods) and short-term (maturing in one period) debts to acquire A units
of risky assets maturing at date 2 and M units of cash. The contractual values of long-term
and short-term debts are L2 and S1 respectively. The returns of the risky assets are given
exogenously, with each unit of A pays a gross amount of 2 at date 2. Let 0 and 1 be the
expected value of 2 at dates 0 and 1 such that
1 = 0 + "1
2 = 1 + "2;
where "1 and "2 are independently distributed random variables following normal distribu-
tions with mean 0, precision 1 and 2, and cumulative functions F1() and F2(). Here, 1
and 2 can be interpreted as public signals available at date 0 and 1, respectively.
Debt contracts considered here are incomplete that they cannot specify the legal con-
sequences of every possible state of the world. In addition, there is a maturity mismatch
between short-term debt nancing and long-term asset holding. For simplicity, we assume
the expected asset return at date 0 is suciently large so that creditors are willing to lend
ex ante and the bank's investment decision at date 0 is exogenous. To focus our attention
on the roll-over of short-term lending, we also assume that cash raised by the bank at date
1 is insucient to cover all its short-term borrowing (details are specied below).
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The roll-over game at date 1 involves a bank, a large creditor5, and a continuum of small
creditors indexed by the interval [0; 1]. All players are risk neutral and there is no single
creditor who has enough funds to nance the total short-term debt roll-over. Short-term
debt includes wholesale debt and retail debt. The wholesale component is provided by a
wholesale nancier, while the retail component is borrowed from small creditors. We assume
that the wholesale nancier has a suciently large amount of funds to nance the bank's
short-term debt up to the limit of p 2 (0; 1), while the set of all small creditors together has
a proportion of 1-p. The strategy of creditors is to roll over their debt or not given available
information, while the bank simply bears the consequences of creditors' decisions.
When deciding to roll over at date 1, creditors take into account of two risks faced by the
bank: the insolvency risk at date 2 and the illiquidity risk at date 1. Illiquidity risk is the
probability that the bank will fail because of a run when it would not have been insolvent in
the absence of a run, and insolvency risk is the probability that the bank will fail if there is
no run. Given short-term creditors roll over their debt, the bank may face insolvency risk at
date 2 when asset returns are low. This is illustrated by using bank's date 2 balance sheet
in Table 1. Let S2 be the total amount of rollover, i.e., the contractual value of short-term
debt issued at date 1 and maturing at date 2, and E2 the bank's equity at date 2. Thus, the
bank's balance sheet at date 2 takes the following form.
Table 1: The bank's balance sheet at date 2.
Assets Liabilities
Cash, M Long-term debt, L2
Risky Assets, 2A Short-term debt held by the large creditor, pS2
Short-term debt held by the small creditors, (1  p)S2
Equity, E2
The bank is insolvent at date 2 if its ex post equity is negative,
E2 M + 2A  (L2 + S2) < 0;
The equality denes a critical value of solvency6 in terms of the date 2 returns
2 
L2 + S2  M
A
:
If 2 < 

2, the bank is insolvent at date 2; the recovery rate for short-term creditors is
assumed to be 0 7.
The illiquidity risk occurs at date 1 when the bank has diculty in raising enough cash
to repay its short-term borrowing if a suciently large fraction of creditors choose not to
5A large creditor can also refer to a group of creditors whose measure is not zero and whose actions are
perfectly coordinated.
6For simplicity, we exclude partial liquidation in the interim stage. Introducing partial liquidation, how-
ever, does not change the qualitative nature of our results.
7The qualitatively nature of our results will remain the same even if a positive recovery rate is introduced.
6
roll over their loans. Assume the bank has an outside option of raising new nancing from
markets by pledging its assets as collateral, with the amount 1 raised from each unit of
its risky assets, where  2 [0; 1] reecting capital market liquidity. The total amount of cash
available at date 1 isM+1A. So the bank is illiquid at date 1 if and only ifM+1A < S1.
Dene the liquidity ratio as
  M + 1A
S1
:
Note that the bank has no illiquidity risk when   1. We focus on the case where  < 1, in
which the illiquidity risk is positive. In this case, whether the bank can continue its operation
to date 2 depends on the proportion of short term creditors rolling over their loans. If this
proportion is less than , the bank fails in a run. Those who rolled over are assumed to
receive a payo normalized to zero, and those who did not receive a payo of liquidation
r. If this proportion is larger than , however, the bank remains in operation until date
2. Those who rolled over received either a payo of rs = S2=S1 or 0 depending on whether
the bank is solvent or not, and those who did not obtain r. Table 2 outlines payos to a
creditor, where rows indicate its strategies and columns the states of the bank. If rs < r
,
then the dominant strategy is to foreclose. For 0 < r < rs, there is no dominant strategy.
In this paper, we exploit the strategic uncertainty induced by the imperfect coordination
among creditors. Hence, payos are assumed to be ordered as 0 < r < rs.
Table 2: Payos to a creditor
Action/State Continuation to date 2 Liquidation at date 1
Solvent Insolvent
Roll over rs 0 0
Foreclose r r r
Equilibrium under perfect information (where all short-term creditors observe 1) can be
determined straightforwardly. Rollover decisions depend on whether the bank is liquid and
its solvency probability. When the solvency probability is low, Pr(2  2) < r=rs, the
dominant strategy is to foreclose irrespective of bank's liquidity. When the bank is liquid
(i.e. M + 1A  S1) and solvent in the next period with a suciently high probability
(i.e. Pr(2  2)  r=rs), rollover is the dominant strategy. The coordination problem
occurs when the bank is illiquid (i.e., M + 1A < S1) and solvent with high probability
(i.e., Pr(2  2)  r=rs). If sucient mass of creditors rolls over their debt, a creditor
will roll over; otherwise he/she will foreclose. Because of the uncertainty regarding 2, two
types of ineciencies can arise in equilibrium due to coordination failure. One is inecient
liquidation causing an ex post solvent bank to fail at the interim stage and the other is
inecient roll-over of an ex ante insolvent bank.
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2.2 Imperfect Information
Consider a general case where creditors at date 1 receive imperfect information on 1, with
noisy signals xi and y, observed by small and large creditors, following
xi = 1 + ei
y = 1 + 
where ei and  are normally distributed with mean 0 and precision  and , respectively.
Their respective cumulative distribution functions are denoted by G() and H(). Under
perfect competition, creditors are reluctant to share information so that cov(ei; ) = 0, and
cov(ei; ej) = 0 for i 6= j.
The posteriors of small and large creditors' beliefs in 1 can be obtained through simple
Baysian updating to give
Xi =
22 + xi
2 + 
; (1)
Y =
22 + y
2 + 
: (2)
Following Morris & Shin (2004), we consider \sophisticated" strategies of creditors. A
sophisticated strategy is a decision rule that takes into account both the private information
concerning the fundamentals and high order beliefs of others. When constructing equilibrium
of a game with a continuum of players, it is challenging to keep tracking each layer of each
player's belief of the beliefs of others. Global games provide a simple procedure. As shown
in Morris & Shin (2004), the equilibrium outcome under a sophisticated strategy is the same
as that under a simple strategy in which each creditor chooses the best action for a uniform
belief regarding the proportion of other creditors choosing a certain action. The equilibrium
is constructed by assuming that each player adopts a switching strategy in which a creditor
rolls over whenever his/her estimate of the underlying fundamentals is higher than a given
threshold. Otherwise, he/she forecloses.
For given posterior thresholds Xi and Y
 of small and large creditors, a creditor having
his/her posterior above the trigger implies his/her expected payo from roll-over conditional
on his/her signal must exceed that from not rolling over. Backward induction on the posterior
gives the critical signal received by a creditor. Taking the inverse of (1) and (2), these critical
signals are
xi =
+ 2

Xi  
2

2;
y =
 + 2

Y    2

2:
To simplify treatment, we set 2= ! 0, and 2= ! 0. This implies that either the
public information is uninformative, 2 ! 0, for nite  and  or private information is
accurate,  and/or  ! 1, for a nite 2. Given such conditions, posterior and signal
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thresholds coincide
lim
2=!0
x = X;
lim
2=!0
y = Y :
So a creditor will roll over whenever he/she receives a signal above his/her respective critical
value. To set a benchmark, we rst discuss a special case where all creditors are small.
2.3 Equilibrium with small creditors
The case with only small creditors leads to a symmetric game of Morris & Shin (2010) with
the dierence that, in our case, the liquidity ratio of the bank is not perfectly observable.
Since all creditors are of the same type, he/she adopts the same switching strategy in which
he/she forecloses if his/her signal falls below the same critical value x. Such equilibrium
strategy implies a critical state, 1, below which the bank is liquidated at date 1.
The equilibrium is solved in two steps. The rst step is to derive the liquidation threshold
1 given switching trigger x
. If the true state is 1, foreclosure of a critical mass of creditors
is needed to force the liquidation of the bank. At the liquidation threshold 1, we must have
M + 1A = S1Pr(x  xj1); (3)
where Pr(x  xj1) is the probability of foreclosure given the true state 1. Since a creditor
has a uniform belief regarding the proportion of creditors that foreclose, Pr(x  xj1) is
also the fraction of creditors who do not roll over. Equation (3) simply indicates that at the
liquidation threshold, the bank can raise just enough cash to cover foreclosure. Given the
distribution of signal, we have
Pr(x  xj1) = G(x   1):
Let D be the total debt (i.e., D = S1+L2), and  the short-term debt ratio (i.e.,  = S1=D).
Equation (3) can be rewritten as
M + 1A = D G(x   1): (4)
Second, we derive the indierence condition between rolling over and foreclosing. This
requires that the expected payo of rollover conditional on the signal is the same as the
liquidation payo. After rollover, the conditional probability for a creditor to obtain rs is
the joint probability that the bank can continue its operation till date 2 and it is solvent
given signal, i.e.,
Pr(1 > 

1 and 2 > 

2jx) = [1  Pr(1  1jx)][1  Pr(2  2jx)]
= [1 G(1   x)][1  F2(2   x)]:
Here, conditional on the updated signal, the interim probability of insolvency is
N1(xi) = Pr(2  2 j xi) = F2(2   xi):
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This probability is derived from Pr(2  2 j xi) = Pr("2   ei  2   xi j xi). Because
2=! 0, it is straightforward to see that "2   ei is normally distributed with precision 2,
and its cumulative function is F2(). Hence, the indierence condition becomes
[1 G(1   x)][1  F2(2   x)]rs = r: (5)
From (4) and (5), one can solve for unique equilibrium 1 and x
 (see Morris and Shin, 2004
for the proof).
The interim illiquidity risk is the probability that the bank will fail in a run but would
have been solvent if no run occurs. With small creditors alone, the interim illiquidity risk is
L1(1) =
(
1  F2(2   1); 1  1
0; 1 > 

1
:
The feature of the interim credit risk is shown in Figure 1, where the horizontal axis
represents 1 and the vertical the interim credit risk. The interim insolvency risk is shown
by the broken line. As 1 is the unconditional expectation of 2, the interim insolvency
risk is decreasing in 1. The interim illiquidity risk is represented by the distance between
the horizontal continuous line and the broken line in the shaded area. When 1 > 

1, the
bank has enough cash to meet its short-term claims, the interim illiquidity risk is zero. The
insolvency risk on the right side of the critical point 1 represents the probability that the
bank will fail even after a successful rollover. Thus, the decomposition of interim credit risk
depends on 1: for 1 to the left of the liquidation threshold, 

1, credit risk contains both
illiquidity and insolvency risk; to the right of 1, it only contains insolvency risk.
Figure 1: Interim credit risk with small creditors only.
From the point of view of a long-term creditor, knowing the ex ante credit risk at date 0
is of central importance. The ex ante insolvency risk is
N0(0) =
+1Z
 1
F2(

2   1)f(1   0)d1; (6)
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where f is the density function of F1. This is given by the expectation of the area under the
broken line indicated in Figure 1. The ex ante illiquidity risk is
L0(0) =
1Z
 1
[1  F2(2   1)]f(1   0)d1; (7)
which is given by the expectation of the shaded area indicated in Figure 1.
3 Equilibrium with heterogenous creditors
We now turn to the case with both small and large creditors. As shown in Corsetti et
al. (2004), there is unique equilibrium characterized by both types of creditors using their
respective switching strategies around their trigger point x and y. These are the only equi-
librium strategies that can survive the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
To determine the equilibrium, we consider two situations under which the bank fails at the
interim stage. The rst is when foreclosures by small creditors alone are sucient to make
the bank fail. The second is when the additional foreclosure by the large creditor is needed.
First, consider the liquidation brought by small creditors alone. Let 1 be the liquidation
threshold with small creditors only. The discussion in section 2.3 suggests that this threshold
must satisfy
M + A1 = D(1  p)G(x   1); (8)
where 1  p is the total measure of small creditors. For 1 < 1, the bank will be liquidated
at date 1 due to foreclosures by small creditors regardless of the large creditor's action.
For 1  1, whether the bank remains in operation depends on whether the large creditor
foreclosures or not.
Next, consider the liquidation brought by the additional foreclosure by the large creditor.
The total amount of foreclosure includes two components: foreclosure by the large creditor
Dp and foreclosures by small creditors D(1   p)G(x   1). Thus, the bank will fail
whenever
D[p+ (1  p)G(x   1)] > M + 1A:
Dene the liquidation threshold of both types of creditors as 1 such that the above holds
as an equality
M + A1 = D[p+ (1  p)G(x   1)]: (9)
It is clear that 1  1. For 1  1 > 1, the bank fails if the large creditor forecloses. For
1 > 1, bank can continue its operation till date 2 irrespective of actions by both creditors.
How 1 and 1 are determined is illustrated in Figure 2 where the horizontal axis rep-
resents 1 and the vertical the probabilities of foreclosures. Line 1 is A1=D + M=D.
Line 2 is (1   p)G(x   1), representing the probability of foreclosure by small creditors.
Line 3 is p+ (1  p)G(x  1), representing the probability of foreclosure by both creditors.
Line 1 intersects Line 2 and Line 3, respectively, at 1 and 1. Note that both 1 and 1 are
functions of the switching point x, which, in turn, depends on the large creditor's switching
point y because each creditor's payo depends on the others' actions.
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Figure 2: Liquidation thresholds with heterogenous creditors.
To solve for these two switching points, two additional equations in terms of 1, 1, x
,
and y are needed. We appeal to the fact that both types of creditors are indierent between
foreclosing and rolling over at their own switching point, x or y. The large creditor, based
on the signal he/she receives, assigns probability H(1   y) to the event that 1  1. Only
when 1 > 1 can the large creditor's rollover save the bank at date 1. The insolvency risk
that the large creditor assigns is F2(

2   y). Thus, the indierence condition for the large
creditor is
[1 H(1   y)][1  F2(2   y)]rs = r (10)
where y is the large creditor's switching point. The large creditor will roll over if and only
if his/her signal surpasses this switching point.
A small creditor's problem is a bit more complicated. In the region ( 1; 1], a small
creditor receiving a signal x assigns probability
R 1
 1 g(1  x)d1 to the event that the bank
fails regardless of the actions of the large creditor, where g() is the density function of G().
In the region of (1; 1], the bank fails if the large creditor forecloses. The probability that
the large creditor forecloses at 1, given his trigger strategy around y
, is H(y  1). Hence,
the indierence condition is2641 
0B@G (1   x) + 1Z
1
g (1   x)H (y   1) d1
1CA
375 (1  F2 (2   x)) rs = r (11)
where F2(

2 x) is the insolvency risk assigned by a small creditor based on his/her signal.
With these four equations, the unique equilibrium dened by fx,y, 1, 1g can be obtained.
The existence of such equilibrium is given by the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 There exists a unique dominance solvable equilibrium in the game in which
the large creditor uses the switching strategy around y and the small creditors use the switch-
ing strategy around x.
Proof: See Appendix.
4 Equilibrium properties
We can now address the question of how short-term debt nancing, capital market liquidity
and the presence of the large creditor aect the bank's vulnerability to a run. The equilibrium
eects in the presence of the large creditor consist of an information and a size eect, which
leads to two natural questions. Does the involvement of a better informed large creditor
increase the willingness of the small creditors to roll over? Does an increase in the size of the
larger creditor make the small creditors more willing to roll over? To provide answers to these
questions, we present comparative statics of equilibrium eects by means of propositions.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
What is the eect of having a larger proportion of short-term debt nancing in the bank's
capital structure? The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 2 All thresholds (1; 1; x
; y) are increasing in the short-term debt ratio.
A number of studies, such as Bulow & Shoven (1978), White (1989), Morris and Shin
(2001) and Detragiache & Garella (1994), nd that a larger number of creditors makes
debt renegotiation more dicult because of coordination failure. With an increase in the
short-term debt nancing, the bank is more likely to encounter liquidity problem at date
1, making coordination of debt rollover even more dicult. Consistent with such intuition,
this proposition suggests that heavy reliance on short-term debt nancing makes the bank
more vulnerable to creditor runs.
Are creditors more willing to roll over if the capital markets are more liquid? The
following proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 3 All thresholds (1; 1; x
; y) are decreasing with respect to market liquidity
.
Proposition 3 implies that, when the capital markets are more liquid, creditors are more
willing to roll over. This is intuitive because high capital market liquidity makes it easy for
the bank to access an alternative source of short-term nancing at the interim stage to ease
its liquidity problem, and thereby making coordination problem less severe. Conversely, a
deterioration in capital market liquidity reduces the bank's liquidity, and raises all thresholds.
Here, we focus on the borrower's balance sheet by implicitly assuming that the creditors'
balance sheets are not aected. Thus, a creditor does not foreclose because his/her nancial
position deteriorates. Considering creditors' balance sheets would amplify this eect.
Does it matter whether the large creditor has greater precision in its information on
1? This question raises a central issue in the analysis regarding the equilibrium eect, if
any, of improving the quality of the large creditor's information. The following proposition
synthesizes the result.
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Proposition 4 All thresholds (1; 1; x
; y) decrease with the precision of the large creditor's
information.
This proposition suggests, ceteris paribus, a higher precision in the information for the
large creditor increases the willingness of the small creditors to roll over their loans. Here
high precision of information on 1 means creditors have more precise information on the
bank's liquidity situation at date 1. Intuitively, if the large creditor has arbitrarily more
precise information on the bank's liquidity, his switching point is reduced. This reduction,
in turn, lowers the switching point of the small creditors because of the interaction between
their high order beliefs. Given such interaction, if the value of continuation is ex post higher
than the value of liquidation, a small creditor relying on precise information from the large
creditor can minimize the error of foreclosing and losing the opportunity of receiving higher
payos. By taking this into account, the large creditor is more likely to roll over. The
iteration of such interaction reenforce itself, so in equilibrium, increasing the accuracy of the
large creditor's information makes small creditors more willing to roll over.
Does an increase in the size of the larger creditor make the small creditors more willing
to roll over? Unfortunately, it is not always possible to analytically provide a denitive
answer to this question (i.e., whether x is decreasing with the size of the large creditor p).
Generally speaking, we know that the size eects on thresholds x, y and 1 are the same.
They are negative (or positive otherwise) if and only if
b2b5(1 G(x   1))
g(x   1)
<
b1(b3b6 + b4)G(x
   1)
g(x   1)
;
where parameters b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, and b6 are as dened in Appendix A. The liquidation
threshold 1 is decreasing in p if
dx
dp
>
1 G(x   1)
(1  p)g(x   1)
:
To further explore the size eect, we proceed in two ways: analytically and numerically.
Analytically, we focus on the limiting case where  ! 1,  ! 1 , and 2 ! 0. In other
words, creditors have precise information, but the public information is uninformative.
To assess analytically the size eect in the limiting case, we rst summarise some interim
technical results in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 For !1,  !1 , and 2 ! 0,
x = y = 1 = 1; if 1  t;
and
x = y = 1 < 1; if 1 > t;
where t  [D(1  p) M ]=A.
This suggests that we can focus on 1 and 1 for the size eects in equilibrium. To
proceed further, we show how 1 can be determined in the limiting case.
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Lemma 2 For !1,  !1, and 2 ! 0, the liquidation threshold 1 is
1 = [D(1  p)G( ) M ]=A;
where   p(1   x).
For 1 > t,  is the unique solution to
1 G () 
+1Z

g (k)H
r


(   k) H 1

1  2r

rs

dk =
2r
rs
: (12)
For 1  t,  is the unique solution to
1 G () 
 Z

g (k)H
r


(   k) H 1

1  2r

rs

dk =
2r
rs
; (13)
where   = G 1(G[) + p=(1  p)].
From the lemma above, the size eect on 1 in the limiting case is given by
d1
dp
=
D
A
[ G( )  (1  p)g( )] d
dp
:
We can only determine the sign of the size eect on 1 unambiguously if 1 > t. This result
is summarised as follows.
Proposition 5 In the limit as !1,  !1, and 2 ! 0, the liquidation threshold 1 is
decreasing in p provided that 1 > t.
Hence, increasing the size of the large creditor raises the willingness of the small creditors
to roll over in the limiting case when 1 < 1.
8
We need to emphasize that in the limiting case even when everyone has arbitrarily pre-
cise information, the interval of inecient liquidation or roll-over persists due to strategic
uncertainty. This is because in either the case where 1 = 1 = x
 = y or 1 = x
 = y < 1,
these thresholds are still above 0. The positive thresholds imply that in equilibrium there is
always inecient liquidation or inecient rollover.
To further explore the size eect we resort to numerical examples. We calibrate param-
eters under two conditions. First, the payo to foreclosing is chosen to be quite low relative
to that of roll-over so that the insolvency risk is high and/or the capital markets are quite
8 The size eect in our model is similar to that in Corsetti et al. (2004), i.e., it can be generally ambiguous.
They obtained unambiguous size eect in two limiting cases: when = ! 0 or when = ! 1. In our
model, we can show that, as = !1, the liquidation threshold 1 is decreasing in p when 1  t. However,
when = ! 0, the left hand side of (12) and (13) is zero, which means that solvency risk is 1 and r=rs = 1.
Therefore, we cannot use this method to prove that the size eect is globally positive because that it lowers
1.
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Table 3: Parameter value for numerical solutions.
Cash, M 10 Assets, A 121
Haircut, 1   0.25 Payo ratio, r=rs 0.45
Long-term debt, L2 21 Short-term debt, S1 100
Private information precision, ;  1 Public information precision, 2 1/3
illiquid.9 Second, to be consistent with our model, the liquidity ratio is chosen to be strictly
smaller than 1, or  < 1. This leads to 1 < (S1  M)=A. Values of these parameters
are given in Table 3. Setting values for the parameters, such as M;S1; L2; A, aects only
the size of the bank's balance sheet, and thereby does not aect the qualitative nature of
our primary results. Because insolvency risk is high, the payo ratio is set to 0.45, and the
haircut is 25 percent so that the capital markets are quite illiquid. Both types of creditors'
information precision is set to 1, while the public information precision is 1/3.
Then, we solve a system of four nonlinear equations. We plotted all thresholds as a
function of p in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows that all thresholds, except 1, are decreasing in p.
Recall that 1 is dened as the critical state where additional foreclosure by the large creditor
is needed to make the bank fail. As p increases, this additional foreclosure becomes larger.
However, both the large and small creditors' switching points are decreasing in p. Thus,
an increase in p not only makes the large creditor more willing to roll over, but also raises
the willingness of the small creditors to roll over. To verify the robustness of the results, we
perform the same computation using dierent values for f; ; ; 2g. The results are proven
to be robust.
Figure 3: Thresholds as functions of the size of the large creditor p.
9We make this choice to avoid distribution functions being too close to step functions. This requires that
the variances of distributions are not too small. As the variance of asset returns represents risk, we adjust
the ratio of the liquidation value to the continuation return proportionally with the variances.
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5 Credit risk
Having established the equilibrium eects, we can now address the primary question of how
short-term nancing, capital market liquidity and the presence of the large creditor aects
credit risk. In the interim period, insolvency risk is
N1(1) = F2(

2   1);
and illiquidity risk is
L1 (1) =
8><>:
1  F2 (2   1) 1  1
H (y   1) (1  F2 (2   1)) 1 < 1  1
0 1 > 1
For 1 in the region (1; 1], H (y
   1) is the probability that the large creditor forecloses
at 1, given his trigger strategy around y
.
The interim credit risk is C1 (1) = N1 (1) + L1 (1) such that
C1 (1) =
8><>:
1 1  1
H (y   1) (1  F2 (2   1)) + F2(2   1) 1 < 1  1
F2 (

2   1) 1 > 1
The ex ante insolvency risk is
N0 (0) =
+1Z
 1
f1 (1   0)F2 (2   1) d1;
and the ex ante illiquidity risk is
L0 (0) =
1Z
 1
(1  F2 (2   1)) f1 (1   0) d1
+
1Z
1
H (y   1) (1  F2(2   1)) f1 (1   0) d1: (14)
The ex ante credit risk is
C0 (0) = N0 (0) + L0 (0) :
Note that the changes in thresholds aect the ex ante credit risk only through the ex ante
illiquidity risk. Thus, we focus on how the ex ante illiquidity risk is aected. We study rst
how the credit risk is aected by short-term nancing, capital market liquidity and a better
informed large creditor. The following proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 6 The ex ante illiquidity risk is increasing in the short term debt ratio, but it
is decreasing in market liquidity and in the precision of the large creditor's information.
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First, greater reliance on short-term debt nancing increases the probability of creditor
runs and credit risk. Second, an increase in market liquidity reduces credit risk. Conversely,
a deterioration in capital market liquidity raises credit risk. Finally, a higher precision in the
large creditor's information concerning the bank's liquidity at date 1 decreases credit risk.
To study the size eect on credit risk, we dierentiate (14) with respect to p. Interestingly,
it depends on how 1, y
 and 1 vary with respect to p (See Appendix A). Because 1 and y

are decreasing in p, while 1 is increasing in p, the sign of dL0 (0) =dp cannot be determined
unambiguously. To explain this result, we use the liquidation threshold 1, when all creditors
are small, as a benchmark. The interim illiquidity risk with two types of creditors is displayed
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Interim credit risk with two types of creditors.
Figure 4 depicts the interim credit risk as a function of the expected asset return 1 with
two types of creditors. The broken line represents the insolvency risk. The distance between
the horizontal solid lines and the broken line represents the interim illiquidity risk. The
shaded area to the left of 1 represents the portion of the illiquidity risk that is decreased
due to the presence of the large creditor, while the shaded area to the right of 1 represents
the portion of the illiquidity risk that is increased due to the presence of the large creditor.
Suppose, initially, that the short-term debt is all held by the small creditors and that the
critical sate without the large creditor is 1. Now, the short-term debt is held by both the
large and the small creditors. The presence of the large creditor will lower 1 but raise 1.
Since 1  1  1), 1 separates the [1; 1] into two regions. Without the large creditor, the
interim illiquidity risk is the distance between the horizontal continuous line and the broken
line in the area to the left of 1. With the large creditor, because the large creditor rolls over
with a positive probability 1   H(y   1) for 1 in the region (1; 1], the shaded area to
the left of 1 represents part of the illiquidity risk that is decreased due to the presence of
the large creditor. This is primarily because the presence of the large creditor reduces the
incidence of imperfect coordination between small creditors and thereby decreases illiquidity
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risk. At the same time, the presence of the large creditor pushes 1 to the right of 

1. The
shaded area to the right of 1 represents the part of the illiquidity risk that is increased
due to the presence of the large creditor. This is because the presence of the large creditor
introduces new imperfect coordination between small creditors and the large one and thereby
increases illiquidity risk. The overall impact of the presence of the large creditor on the credit
risk depends on which of the aforementioned eects dominates.
Analytically, considering the expectation of the shaded area indicated in Figure 4, if the
decreased part is larger than the increased part, then the ex ante illiquidity risk will decrease
in p. In this case, an increase in the size of the large creditor reduces the credit risk. However,
if the decreased part is smaller than the increased part in terms of credit risk, then the ex
ante illiquidity risk will increase in p. Finally, if these opposite eects are equal, then the ex
ante illiquidity risk is constant in p.
To further explore the size eect on credit risk, we numerically solve the model and
compute the ex ante illiquidity risk as a function of p using the same parameter setting in
Table 3. We plotted the ex ante illiquidity risk as a function of p in Figure 5. Figure 5 shows
that an increase in the size of the large creditor lowers credit risk. This result holds provided
that public information is less precise than private information and the payo ratio r=rs is
quite low.
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Figure 5: Ex ante illiquidity risk as a function of the size of the large creditor p.
What is the size eect if private information is less precise than public information? The
question is relevant, as pointed out by Huang & Ratnovski (2011), that creditors invest less
on improving their private information and rely on costly public information provided by
rating agencies. We set private and public information precision to 1 and 2 respectively in
keeping other parameters unchanged. Interestingly, as Figure 6 shows, an increase in the
size of the large creditor raises credit risk. When private information is less precise than
public information, a larger proportion of wholesale funding raises credit risk.
What is the size eect of the large creditor if liquidation value is only slightly lower
than continuation value? We set the payo ratio r=rs to 0:8 keeping other parameters
unchanged. As Figure 7 shows, an increase in the size of the large creditor raises credit risk
if the premium of rolling over is small.
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Figure 6: Ex ante illiquidity risk as a function of the size of the large creditor p with
=2 = =2 = 1=2.
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Figure 7: Ex ante illiquidity risk as a function of the size of the large creditor p with
r=rs = 0:8.
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In pulling together our discussion, the overall conclusion that we draw from our analysis is
that short-term nancing, capital market liquidity and the presence of the large creditor are
important determinants of credit risk. These conclusions are the most clear cut regarding the
eects of short-term nancing, capital market liquidity and a better informed large creditor.
Analytically the size eect of the large creditor is ambiguous. Our numerical calculations
reveal that an increase in the size of the large creditor lowers credit risk provided that private
information is more precise than public information and the payo ratio r=rs is quite low.
However, an increase in the size of the large creditor raises credit risk if public information
is more precise than private information or the payo ratio r=rs is quite high.
6 Concluding remarks
Recent documented evidence has indicated that heavy reliance on short-term debt nancing
had a signicant impact on the severity of the 2007/8 nancial crisis. This may be partly
rationalised in terms of our model. The size eect discussed earlier suggests that if private
information on the bank's future protability is very coarse, an increase in the size of the
whole-sale nancier will raise the credit risk. The wide-spread use of structured nancial
products and their complex nature make it dicult for individual banks to gather accurate
information about the underlying risks associated with these products. In this case, the
presence of the large whole-sale nancier makes it more dicult for creditors to coordinate
their action to roll over the existing debt. The situation is exacerbated when the market
liquidity declines, resulting in a credit market freeze.
These results are obtained when the focus is placed on the balance sheet eect of banks
(borrowers). However, when the market condition deteriorates, creditors nancial positions
may be adversely aected. This may generate re-sales and make creditors less likely to
roll over their existing debt. Incorporating the balance sheet eect of creditors, one can
endogenize the market liquidity. The interaction between the balance sheet eects of banks
and creditors may lead to a downward spiral on debt roll-overs. So, taking into account of
creditor's nancial positions can generally amplify the eects on credit risks discussed in this
paper.
Given the main assumptions adopted in the paper, our results need to be interpreted
with caution. The rst issue is to do with the simultaneous nature of roll-over decisions.
In practice, creditors can make sequential decisions based on, for example, debt seniority.
Our results will be retained if actions are not observable and/or signals are \cheap talks".
The second issue is associated with the assumed maturity structure of debt ex ante. Given
a bank has substantial short-term debt, it is more likely that the bank will face a liquidity
problem in the interim period. This is the main driving force of the credit risk (in addition to
the coordination problems among heterogenous creditors) in the interim period. To provide
a proper foundation, one needs to tackle the problem of how such maturity structure can
emerge when creditors can select the type of debt contract ex ante.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 In what follows, we show rst that there exists a unique x that
solves equation (11). We then show that this unique switching equilibrium is dominance
solvable.
Dierentiating (8) and (9) with respect to x, respectively, yields
d1
dx
=
D(1  p)g(x   1)
A+ D(1  p)g(x   1)
2 (0; 1);
d1
dx
=
D(1  p)g(x   1)
A+ D(1  p)g(x   1)
2 (0; 1):
Let  = 1   x and  = 1   x. Both  and  are monotonically decreasing in x as
d=dx = d1=dx
   1 < 0
d=dx = d1=dx   1 < 0:
Note that (10) gives the mapping from small creditors' trigger x to the large credi-
tor's trigger y. Dierentiating (10) with respect to x, one can show that this mapping is
monotonic, i.e.,
dy=dx = b3d1=dx
 2 (0; 1); (A.1)
where
b3 =
h(1   y)[1  F2(2   y)]
f2(2   y)[1 H(1   y)] + h(1   y)[1  F2(2   y)]
2 (0; 1):
Rewriting (11) as
	[x; y(x)] 
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 [1  F2 (2   x)] = r=rs: (A.2)
Dierentiating the left hand side of (A.2) with respect to x yields
d	[x; y(x)]
dx
=  g()[1 H(y   x   )] d
dx
  g()H(y   x   ) d
dx
 
Z

g(k)h(y   x   k)

dy
dx
  1

dk
+
f2(

2   x)
1  F2(2   x)
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375
Substitution of (A.1) into the above expression, one can show that 	[x; y(x)] is strictly
increasing in x. For suciently small x, 	[x; y(x)] approaches 0, while for suciently
large x, it approaches 1. As 	[x; y(x)] is continuous in x, there exists a unique solution
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to (11). With x determined in this way, (10) is then used to solve for the large creditor's
switching point y.
We can now proceed to show that this unique switching equilibrium is the only equilibrium
surviving the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Consider the expected
payo to roll-over for a small creditor conditional on signal x when all other small creditors
follow the switching strategy around bx, and when the large creditor plays his best response
y(bx) to this switching strategy, obtained from (10). Denote this expected payo by u(x; bx).
It is given by
u(x; bx) =
2641 
0B@G (1(bx)  x) +
1(bx)Z
1(bx)
g (1   x)H (y(bx)  1) d1
1CA
375 [1  F2 (2   x)] rs;
where (bx) and (bx) indicate the value of  and  when small creditors follow the switching
strategy around bx. We allow bx 2 R [ f 1;1g take the values  1 and 1, by which the
small creditors respectively never and always foreclose. As shown above, u(:; :) is increasing
in its rst argument and decreasing in its second.
For suciently high values of x, rolling over is a dominant action for a small creditor,
regardless of the actions of others, small or large. Denote by x1 the threshold value of x
above which it is a dominant action to roll over for a small creditor. Since all creditors
realize this, any strategy to foreclose above x1 is dominated by rolling over. Then, it cannot
be rational for a small creditor to foreclose whenever his signal is higher than x2, where x2
solves
u(x2; x1) = r
It is so, since the switching strategy around x2 is the best reply to the switching strategy
around x1 played by other small creditors and to that of the wholesale nancier y(x1),
and since even the small creditor that assumes the lowest possibility of the continuation of
the project believes that the incidence of continuation is higher than that implied by the
switching strategy around x1and y(x1). Since the payo to rolling over is increasing in the
incidence of continuation by the other creditors, any strategy that refrains from rolling over
for signals higher than x2 is strictly dominated. Since
u
 
x1;1 = u  x2; x1 = r
monotonicity of u implies x1 > x2. Thus, suppose xk 1 > xk, monotonicity implies that
xk > xk+1. We can generate a decreasing sequence
x1 > x2 > x3::: > xk > :::
where any strategy that refrains from rolling over for signal x > xk does not survive k rounds
of deletion of dominated strategies. Since the sequence is bounded, assuming x is the largest
solution to u(x; x) = r, then monotonicity of u implies that
x = lim
k!1
xk
Any strategy that refrains from rolling over for signal higher than x does not survive iterated
dominance.
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Conversely, if x is the smallest solution to u(x; x) = r, any strategy that refrains from
foreclosing for a signal below x does not survive iterative elimination. If there is a unique
solution to u(x; x) = L, then the smallest solution is the largest solution. Therefore, there
is only one strategy that remains after eliminating all iteratively dominated strategies. This
strategy is the only equilibrium strategy. This completes the argument.
Proof of Proposition 2 Dierentiating (8) and (9) with respect to  , respectively, pro-
vides
dx
d
=
1
b1
d1
d
  G (x
   1)
g (x   1)
;
dx
d
=
1
b2
d1
d
  p+ (1  p)G
 
x   1

 (1  p) g  x   1 ;
where
b1 = [1 + A=D(1  p)g(x   1)] 1 < 1;
b2 = [1 + A=D(1  p)g(x   1)] 1 < 1:
Let  = 1   x and  = 1   x. Then we obtain
d
d
= (b1   1) dx

d
+
b1G (x
   1)
g (x   1)
d
d
= (b2   1) dx

d
+
b2

p+ (1  p)G  x   1
 (1  p) g  x   1
Dierentiating (10) with respect to  , we obtain
dy
d
= b3
d1
d
;
where
b3 =
h (1   y) [1  F2(2   y)]
f2 (2   y) (1 H (1   y)) + h (1   y) [1  F2(2   y)]
2 (0; 1):
Then
dy
d
= b3b1
dx
d
+
b1b3G (x
   1)
g (x   1)
:
We can rewrite (7) as2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 [1  F2 (2   x)] rs = r (A.3)
24
Dierentiating (A.3) with respect to  , we obtain
 g () (1 H (y   x   )) d
d
  g  H  y   x    d
d
 
Z

g (k)h (y   x   k)

dy
d
  dx

d

dk
+
f2 (

2   x)
1  F2 (2   x)
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 dx
d
= 0
Let w = r=[1   F2(2   y)]rs > 0. Then, 1   H(y   x   ) = w. By substitution, we
obtain
b4 (1  b1) dx

d
+ b5 (1  b2) dx

d
+ b6(1  b1b3)dx

d
+ b7
dx
d
=
b1(b3b6 + b4)G (x
   1)
g (x   1)
+
b2b5

p+ (1  p)G  x   1
 (1  p) g  x   1
where
b4 = wg () > 0
b5 = g
 


H
 
y   x    > 0;
b6 =
Z

g (k)h (y   x   k) dk > 0;
b7 =
f2 (

2   x)
1  F2 (2   x)
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 > 0:
Because b1 and b2 are smaller than one, all of the coecients on the left hand side of the
above equation are positive. Thus, we have dx=d > 0, then dy=d > 0, d1=d > 0, and
d1=d > 0. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Dierentiating (8) and (9) with respect to , respectively,
yields
dx
d
=
1
b1
d1
d
+
1A
D (1  p) g (x   1)
dx
d
=
1
b2
d1
d
+
1A
D (1  p) g  x   1 :
We have
d
d
= (b1   1) dx

d
  b11A
D (1  p) g (x   1)
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d
d
= (b2   1) dx

d
  b21A
D (1  p) g  x   1
Dierentiating (10) with respect to , we obtain
dy
d
= b1b3
dx
d
  b1b31A
D (1  p) g (x   1)
:
Dierentiating (A.3) with respect to , we obtain
b4 (1  b1) dx

d
+ b5 (1  b2) dx

d
+ b6(1  b1b3)dx

d
+ b7
dx
d
=   b1(b3b6 + b4)1A
D (1  p) g (x   1)
  b2b51A
D (1  p) g  x   1
Thus, we have dx=d < 0, dy=d < 0, d1=d < 0, and d1=d < 0. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Dierentiating (8) and (9) with respect to the precision of
the large lender's information , we obtain
dx
d
=
1
b1
d1
d
;
dx
d
=
1
b2
d1
d
;
Then, we have
d
d
= (b1   1)dx

d
d
d
= (b2   1)dx

d
:
Moreover, we can write (10) in standard normal and dierentiate it with respect to  such
that
(1  F2 (2   y))


p
 (1   y)
p


d1
d
  dy

d

+
1
2
p

(1   y)

= [1 H (1   y)] f2 (2   y)
dy
d
;
which yields
dy
d
= b1c1
dx
d
+
c1
2
(1   y) ;
where
c1 =
(1  F2 (2   y))
 p
 (1   y)
p

(1  F2 (2   y))
 p
 (1   y)
p
 + (1 H (1   y)) f2 (2   y)
2 (0; 1):
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Dierentiating (A.3) with respect to , we obtain
 g () (1 H (y   x   )) d
d
  g  H  y   x    d
d
 
Z

hx (k)
p
 (y   x   k)
p


dy
d
  dx

d

+
y   x   k
2
p


dk
+
f2 (

2   x)
1  F2 (2   x)
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 dx
d
= 0;
which can be rearranged as
 g () (1 H (y   x   )) (b1   1) dx

d
  g  H  y   x    (b2   1) dx
d
 
Z

g (k)
p
 (y   x   k)
p
 (b1c  1) dx

d
+
c1(1   y) + y   1 +    k
2
p


dk
+
f2 (

2   x)
1  F2 (2   x)
2641 G ()  Z

g (k)H (y   x   k) dk
375 dx
d
= 0:
Then, we obtain
b4(1  b1)dx

d
+ b5 (1  b2) dx

d
+ b6
p
 (1  b1c1) dx

d
+ b7
dx
d
=
Z

g (k)
p
 (y   x   k)
 c1(1   y) + y   1 +    k
2
p

dk;
Note that 1 y < 0. Because 1 < 1, the integrand y 1+ k evaluated between  and
 is strictly negative. Hence, that dx

d
< 0, then dy=d < 0, d1=d < 0, and d1=d < 0 is
straightforward. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Note that (10) can be rewritten as
H
p
(1   y)

= 1  2r

rs
; (A.4)
in which as 2 ! 0, 1   F2 (2   y) = 1=2 is employed. Because H
 p
(1   y)
  0, we
have r=rs  1=2. To make the analysis tractable, we assume r=rs < 1=2. As  ! 1, we
must have y ! 1, or else H
 p
(1   y)

will be either zero or one. Hence, the large
creditor will roll over at states to the right of 1. When the small creditors have very precise
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information, they will also roll over at sates to the right of 1. Thus, in the limit case, we
have
x = y = 1:
The bank fails if and only if 1 < 1. The question of whether a larger creditor raises the
willingness of the small creditors to roll over hinges on the behavior at the critical state 1.
In solving for the critical state 1 in the limiting case, we need to distinguish two cases.
In the limit, from (8) and (9), we have
1 2

 M
A
;
D(1  p) M
A

1 2

Dp M
A
;
D  M
A

:
Thus, we can distinguish the case when 1  t from the case when 1 > t, where t 
[D(1  p) M ] =A. In the former case, 1 = 1. However, in the latter case, 1 < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, suppose that lim 1 < lim 1 so that lim 1  [D(1   p)  
M ]=A. Because x ! 1, we must have  =
p
(1   x)! +1. Then (11) in this case is
1 G () 
+1Z

g (k)H
r


(   k) H 1

1  2r

rs

dk =
2r
rs
where y = 1  H 1(1  2r=rs) is used.
Second, consider the case where lim 1 = lim 1 so that  is nite and
(1  p) (1 G ()) = p+ (1  p)  1 G   ;
which yields
 = G 1

G () +
p
1  p

:
Hence, in this case, (11) is
1 G () 
 Z

g (k)H
r


(   k) H 1

1  2r

rs

dk =
2r
rs
;
where   = G 1[G() + p=(1  p)]. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. Dierentiating (8) and (9) with respect to p provides
dx
dp
=
1
b1
d1
dp
+
G (x   1)
(1  p) g (x   1)
;
dx
dp
=
1
b2
d1
dp
  1 G
 
x   1

(1  p) g  x   1 ;
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and
d
dp
= (b1   1) dx

dp
  b1G (x
   1)
(1  p) g (x   1)
d
dp
= (b2   1) dx

dp
+
b2
 
1 G  x   1
(1  p) g  x   1 :
Dierentiating (10) with respect to p provides
dy
dp
= b1b3
dx
dp
  b1b3G (x
   1)
(1  p) g (x   1)
:
Dierentiating (A.3) with respect to p provides
b4 (1  b1) dx

dp
+ b5 (1  b2) dx

dp
+ b6(1  b1b3)dx

dp
+ b7
dx
dp
=  b1(b3b6 + b4)G (x
   1)
(1  p) g (x   1)
+
b2b5
 
1 G  x   1
(1  p) g  x   1
Thus, only when
b2b5
 
1 G  x   1
g
 
x   1
 < b1(b3b6 + b4)G (x   1)
g (x   1)
;
we have dx=dp < 0. Because, analytically, we cannot prove whether this condition holds or
not, we solve the model numerically. We nd that dx=dp < 0, dy=dp < 0, and d1=dp < 0.
However, d1=dp > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Dierentiating(14) with respect to the short-term debt ratio
provides
dL0 (0)
d
= (1 H (y   1)) (1  F2 (2   1)) f1 (1   0)
d1
d
+H
 
y   1
  
1  F2
 
2   1

f1
 
1   0
 d1
d
+
1Z
1
[h (y   1) (1  F2(2   1))] f1 (1   0) d1
dy
d
Because we have d1=d > 0, d1=d > 0 and dy
=d > 0, we obtain
dL0 (0)
d
> 0:
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Dierentiating (14) with respect to market liquidity  provides
dL0 (0)
d
= (1 H (y   1)) (1  F2 (2   1)) f1 (1   0)
d1
d
+H
 
y   1
  
1  F2
 
2   1

f1
 
1   0
 d1
d
+
1Z
1
[h (y   1) (1  F2(2   1))] f1 (1   0) d1
dy
d
Because we have d1=d < 0, d1=d < 0 and dy
=d < 0, we have
dL0 (0)
d
< 0:
Dierentiating (14) with respect to the precision of the large creditor's information gives
dL0 (0)
d
= (1 H (y   1)) (1  F2 (2   1)) f1 (1   0)
d1
d
+H
 
y   1
  
1  F2
 
2   1

f1
 
1   0
 d1
d
+
1Z
1
h

p
 (y   1)

(1  F2(2   1))
i
f1 (1   0)
p

dy
d
+
y   1
2
p


d1
Because 1 < 1, the integrand y
   1 evaluated between 1 and 1, is strictly negative.
Furthermore, we have proven that d1=d < 0, dy
=d < 0, and d1=d < 0. Hence,
dL0 (0)
d
< 0:
Dierentiating (14) with respect to the size of the large creditor provides
dL0 (0)
dp
= (1 H (y   1)) (1  F2 (2   1)) f1 (1   0)
d1
dp
+H
 
y   1
  
1  F2
 
2   1

f1
 
1   0
 d1
dp
+
1Z
1
[h (y   1) (1  F2(2   1))] f1 (1   0) d1
dy
dp
Because we have d1=dp > 0, while d1=dp < 0 and dy
=dp < 0, the sign of dL0(0)=dp is
ambiguous. Together, these complete the proof.
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